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I. INTRODUCTION

According to a recent estimate the cost of judgments, out-ofcourt settlements, investigation expenses and legal fees paid in malpractice cases by the American medical profession and their insurers
now exceeds $45,000,000 each year.' This estimate would indicate
that malpractice claims are far more prevalent and judgments recovered are far larger in other parts of the country than in Colorado. Just how prevalent are these claims? The American Medical
Association has reported that about fourteen per cent of all its members in the United States have been subjected to such claims. 2 In

California, where the claim rate seems to be the highest, one doctor in every four has been charged with malpracticeA
No doubt the average doctor upon first hearing of a malpractice
claim against one of his colleagues is tempted to damn the claimant's attorney. But contrary to the opinions of most medical men,
attorneys very seldom if ever are the initial instigators of medical
malpractice claims. In fact a renowned and highly respected physician who claims many years of "wide experience advising doctors,
helping defense attorneys, appearing in court . . . as an expert witness, and as a defendant ....
,4 recently declared: "My observation
1 Silverman, Medicine's Legal Nightmare, Saturday Evening Post, Apr. 11, 1959, p. 48. It is estimated that about 6,000 claims are filed in the United States each year. Id., Apr. 18, 1959, pp. 31, 115.
In England latest 12 month figures show that out of 3,223 malpractice cases tried in the Queen's Bench
Division, 2,671 resulted in verdicts for the plaintiff-patient. AMA News, July 13, 1959, p. 5, col. 2.
2 Wesson, Medical Malpractice Suits: A Physician's Primer for Defendants, 8 Clev.-Mor. L. Rev. 254
(1959).
8 Wesson, supra note 2 at 254.
4 Ibid.
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has been that every malpractice suit, without any exception, is instigated either directly or indirectly by a doctor." 5
Unquestionably some malpractice claims are without foundation in fact or support in law.6 Just as unquestionably some malpractice claims are well founded in both fact and law.7 It is the
ethical obligation of every attorney to discourage groundless claims
and not to espouse unjust suits. It should be the ethical obligation
of every fair minded physician to co-operate in obtaining justice
for a patient who has been wronged by a fellow physician. The
overriding duty of each profession is to the public. The problem
of both groups is to determine which claims are justified and which
are not. Since fair evaluation of claims can best be accomplished
through understanding of the law governing them, this paper
surveying, summarizing, and criticizing the sizable body of Colorado case law in the field is submitted in the hope that from increased knowledge will grow greater mutual understanding between our brother professions.

II.

THEORY AND NATURE OF THE AcTION

At common law an action for negligent treatment by a physician generally was instituted by a writ of trespass on the case.8
The older action in trespass was unavailable in most cases because
almost always the patient had consented to the touching of his person and therefore he could not plead a direct, forcible trespass. But
in cases where treatment was instituted without consent of the
patient or continued against his will after he had discharged the
physician, the doctor's touching or cutting of the patient's body
might constitute trespass in the nature of battery or both assault
and battery.9 Moreover, where the patient's consent was limited
to a particular treatment or operation and the doctor went beyond
that treatment or performed some unauthorized operation, there
might be a trespass action. Finally, there was sometimes available,
as an alternative, an action in assumpsit based on breach of the physician's express contract to effect a cure or upon an implied contract to. use due care in treatment. 0 Sometimes a single act might
subject the practitioner to an action in trespass, case (negligence),
or contract, at the option of the claimant."
Abolition of common law pleading and of forms of actions has
not eliminated the practical value of understanding these distinctions. The theory of the case is still highly significant. One must
still plead facts which would have allowed a recovery on some
5 Ibid.

(Emphasis added.)
6 See, e.g., Locke v. Van Wyke, 91 Colo. 14, 11 P.2d 563 (1932).
7 For example, Dr. Paul R. Hawley, a director of the American College of Surgeons, is reported to
have said recently that according to reliable estimates, "today one-half of the surgical operations in
the United States are performed by doctors who are untrained or inadequately trained, to undertake
surgery." N.Y. Times, May 28, 1959, § 1, p. 33. The Times reported Dr. Hawley as relating that one of
the world's most distinguished surgeons has stated that at least half his practice consists of attempts
to correct the bad results of surgery undertaken in community hospitals by doctors inadequately trained
in this field. Ibid.
8 Shipman, Common Law Pleading 96 (1923).
9 See the discussion of this problem in Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 74-78, 266 P.2d 1095,
1096 (1954); Cody v. Fraser, 122 Colo. 252, 254-55, 222 P.2d 422, 424 (1950).
10 Shipman, Common Law Pleading 96 (1923).
11 E.g., McClees v. Cohen, 158 Md. 60, 148 All. 124 (1930).
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theory under the prior practice. Furthermore, the theory of the
12
action -may determine what statute of limitations governs it,
whether the plaintiff must prove actual damages to get his claim
to the jury,1 3 whether punitive damages may be recovered,1 4 whether
damages are limited to those within the contemplation of the parties
when the relationship was entered,' whether the action survives
death of a party,"' whether release of a prior tortfeasor releases the
physician called to treat injuries caused by that tortfeasor," and
whether malpractice insurance covers the claim. 18 Most of these
problems have been dealt with in Colorado cases. This article will
be limited to actions on claims for breach of contract, assault and
battery, and negligence."l
A. Breach of Contract
It is fundamental that in the absence of an express contract to
the contrary a physician by undertaking treatment in a particular
case does not warrant a cure or even an improvement in the patient's
condition. 20 The law recognizes that many of "the thousand natural
shocks that flesh is heir to" 21 are incurable, and that intervening
causes quite unrelated to the physician's ministrations "may sometimes thwart the highest
skill employed in the accustomed or only
22
procedure known.
But Colorado cases often have declared that a physician when
employed impliedly contracts: (a) that he possesses a reasonable
degree of learning and skill equal to that ordinarily possessed by
others of his profession, (b) that he will utilize reasonable skill
and observe ordinary care and diligence in exercising his art and
applying his special knowledge to accomplish the purpose of his
employment, and (c) that in diagnosing the disease or injury and
selecting the mode of treatment he will employ his best judg12 For example, in Colorado, an assault and battery action is barred in one year. Colo. Rev. Stat.
But actions in the nature of assumpsit and most actions in the nature of trespass on
the case are governed by a six-year statute of limitations. Id. § 87-1-11(4)&(7). A statute whose constitutionality has never been authoritatively determined purports to bar "tort or implied contract"
actions against anyone "licensed to practice medicine, chiropractic, osteopathy, chiropody, midwifery or
dentistry" in two years. Id. § 87-1-6. For a more extensive discussion of this problem, see the text
at note 210 infra.
13 It is of course elemental that proof of damages is essential to establish a claim based on negligence, but at least nominal damages will be presumed to flow from any assault or battery.
14 See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 41-2-2 (1953); Sams v. Curfman, 111 Colo. 124, 137 P.2d 1017 (1943).
15 This is a fundamental limitation applied, albeit with increasing liberality, to damages for breach
of contract, but not applied at all to tort damages.
16 See Meffley v. Catterson, 132 Colo. 222, 287 P.2d 45 (1955), overruled, Publix Cab Co. v.
Colorado Nat'l Bank, 338 P.2d 702 (Cola 1959). The survival statute involved in Publix Cab Co.
was amended in 1957, and the problem has probably been eliminated as to actions arising under
the later statute. Compare Colo. Rev. Stat. § 152-1-9 (1953), with id. § 152-1.9 (Cum. Supp. 1957).
17 Compare Froid v. Knowles, 95 Colo. 223, 33 P.2d 1116 (1934), with Hennig v. Crested Butte
,:o., 92 Colo. 459, 21 P.2d 1115 (1933). This problem is discussed in detail in the text at note 173 infra.
18 The legal division of the American Medical Association is presently concerned about this most
practical problem. See series of four articles: Malpractice Insurance Changes Needed, beginning in the
AMA News, May 18, 1959, p. 1, col. 2.
19 In at least one reported Colorado case a patient sued his physician on a false imprisonment
theory. Meek v. City of toveland, 85 Colo. 346, 276 Pac. 30 (1929).
20 Gleason v. McKeehan, 100 Colo. 194, 202, 66 P.2d 808, 811 (dictum) (1937); Locke v. Van Wyke,
91 Colo. 14, 20, 11 P.2d 563, 565 (dictum) (1932).
21 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, scene 1.
22 Gleason v. McKeehan, 100 Colo. 194, 202, 66 P.2d 808, 811 (1937).

§ 87-1-2 (1953).
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ment. 23 Thus it is theoretically possible that his failure to perform
these implied promises will give rise to a breach of contract *action.
This possibility is recognized in the statute of limitations on medical
malpractice which is expressly made applicable to actions based
on implied contract. 24 A survey just completed by the American
Medical Association's legal division indicates that among those
who file claims against doctors, "suing for breach of contract has
become more popular. ' 25 However,
this theory of action has seldom
26
been utilized in Colorado.
Besides the possibility of implied contract, it is possible that
a particular physician may at the time of employment promise
to effect a cure or improvement and thereby create an express contract. Even if such representations were considered ethical, no wise
practitioner would indulge in them, for such an agreement would
render him liable without regard to fault if for any reason his treatment did not achieve the promised results. There may be a danger
that in attempting to quiet a patient's fears or to reassure him, a
doctor, without intending to guarantee a cure, might make remarks
which the patient could reasonably interpret as such a guarantee. In
such a case it is possible that a court might find a contractual
obligation. The dangers to the doctor from such unintended contractual entanglements are magnified by the fact that many medical
malpractice insurance policies probably do not cover liability of
a doctor for failure to perform
his contract to accomplish a cure or
27
improvement of condition.
B. Assault and Battery
Colorado case law indicates that a physician who treats or
operates upon a patient without the latter's consent may be liable
for assault and battery. 2 Other jurisdictions have held that a surgeon who has the patient's consent for a particular operation but
goes beyond that consent to perform other or additional surgery is
23 Tadlock v. Lloyd, 65 Colo. 40, 43, 173 Pac. 200, 202 (1918); Bonnet v. Foote, 47 Colo. 282, 285,
107 Pac. 252, 254 (1910); McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Colo. App. 163, 167, 128 Pac. 870, 872-73 (1912).
24Colo. Rev. Stat. § 87-1-6 (1953).
25 AMA News, June 29, 1959, p. 11, col. 1.
26 One attempt was made to rely on a contract theory, but the Supreme Court held that the complaint sounded in tort. Sams v. Curfman, 111 Colo. 124, 137 P.2d 1017 (1943).
27 See note 25 supra.
28 See the discussion in Cody v. Fraser, 122 Colo. 252, 255, 222 P.2d 422, 424 (1950). This was
quoted with apparent approval in Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 75, 266 P.2d 1095, 1096 (1954).
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guilty of an assault and battery. 29 Colorado has rejected the latter
position, at least for purposes of holding the one year limitation
on assault and battery actions inapplicable to such a case.30
From the plaintiff's point of view this theory of action has certain distinct advantages. In such a case the doctor could be held
strictly accountable for an unfortunate result without proof that
he was guilty of the slightest negligence. In many cases the plaintiff by choosing this form of action would by-pass the hurdle of
obtaining expert testimony to prove negligence. Moreover the law
presumes that at least nominal damages flow from every assault
and battery, and the plaintiff could get his case to the jury without proving any actual damages. Exemplary damages would be
possible, since assault and battery are intentional torts.
At least two factors discourage this form of action. First, a recent survey indicates that some medical malpractice insurance
policies may exclude coverage of intentional torts generally or of
treatment without consent,3' and furthermore exemplary damages
are not covered by liability insurance.3 2 Second, a special one year
statute of limitations probably would apply
to some malpractice.
3
actions brought on this theory in Colorado. 3
For the physician seeking to avoid assault and battery claims,
the practical problem is what constitutes a sufficient consent to
authorize treatment or surgery. Apparently Colorado law prescribes no technical requirement of a written, signed consent, even
for serious and irreversible surgery.2 4 But a clear, specific, written
and signed consent from an informed and understanding patient,
or one authorized to consent for him, can be a most effective lawsuit preventive2 5 One who relies on a patient's oral consent may
find himself trying to convince a jury that the patient did consent,
or that the operation performed was the one requested.2 Failing
that he may be held liable even if the operation was done in the
most careful and skillful manner possible. Even worse, he may have
to pay any judgment personally since, as has been noted, his malpractice insurance may
not cover the battery involved in an opera2 7
tion without consent.
No prudent surgeon should wield the scalpel without personally examining a properly signed consent form which clearly
authorizes him to perform a particular operation on a named
patient. He should be chary of relying on the assurances of others
29 Cases collected in Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 695 (1957).
30 Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954).
31 See note 37 infra.
32 Universal Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934).
33 For a fuller discussion see text at note 210 infra.
34 See Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 80, 266 P.2d 1095, 1099 (1954).
35 Taylor, Fewer Malpractice Claims - Via Our American Way - Consent for Treatment, Rocky Mt.
Med. J. (May, 1955).
36 See, e.g., Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943) (whether surgeon who proceeded with
major surgery after procuring consent for only minor surgery was guilty of assault was a jury question); Sullivan v. McGraw, 118 Mich. 39, 76 N.W. 149 (1898) (mixup on oral instructions resulting in
surgery on the wrong leg).
37 In a recent survey, 22 medical malpractice insurers were asked if their policies would cover
this situation: "Dr. Collins operated upon Mrs. King, with her consent, for an ovarian cyst. In the
course of the operation he found that a radical hysterectomy was advisable and thereupon performed this procedure. Mrs. King brought suit against Dr. Collins charging assault and battery in
that he went beyond the consent given.
"Response: Twelve companies would defend and pay. Ten firms qualified their positions, but
would not refuse coverage." AMA News, May 18, 1959, p. 3, col.2.
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that proper consent forms have been executed and filed.3 8 In addi-

tion to written authorization to perform the particular operation
contemplated, it is often advisable to obtain the patient's general
consent to perform other or further surgery whose need becomes apparent only after the patient is unconscious and the incisions for the intended operation have been made. 39 While it is
true that courts generally are liberal in holding that an unconscious patient's consent to surgery reasonably required to pre'
vent death or serious harm is assumed,40
there is no direct Colorado
authority recognizing this legal fiction, and
there is respectable
non-Colorado authority severely limiting it.4'1
A closely related problem is who may consent on behalf of another. While a parent may consent for a child of tender years,' and
a spouse for an incompetent or unconscious husband or wife, generally a mentally competent adult, whether man or woman-married or unmarried-is master of his own person and is the only
one capable of consenting to an operation on that person.4 3 On this
point the Colorado Smith case 44 seems to reach a highly questionable result. There the husband-patient claimed that the only operation he ever discussed with the defendant doctor was a circumcision. The defendant testified that the only conversation he had
with the plaintiff prior to the day of the operation was a consultation in which he, the defendant, recommended a circumcision. But,
said the defendant physician, "all subsequent discussion, including
arrangements for, and instructions relative to, the operation, were
made by him with plaintiff's wife, mostly by telephone."4 5 The plaintiff agreed that "his wife did most of the talking . . ."6 and ad-

mitted that when the date for the operation was set, he, the plaintiff, did not clearly request the circumcision previously recommended. 47 "Defendant . . . further testified that when plaintiff's

wife called him to make definite plans for the operation he asked
her what operation, whether circumcision or sterilization, to which

38 In Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954), the surgeon prior to performing a
vasectomy inquired of the attending physician whether the latter had procured written, signed consents for this sterilization operation from the patient and his wife. The attending physician assured
the surgeon that the consents had been obtained but he unwittingly had left them at his office. The
Supreme Court held that the surgeon, in making this inquiry, "took every precaution that was reasonably required of him, and . . . there is no element of negligence left in the case as to him and he
was entitled to a directed verdict." 129 Colo. at 82, 266 P.2d at 1100. Query: If the patient had consented to no operation, would the surgeon be protected against a claim for battery, as distinguished
from negligence, by reasonable reliance on the assurance of the attending physician that proper consent had been given? It would seem that the attending physician would be powerless to consent on
behalf of the patient to a serious battery. Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
39 See e.g., Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954); Stone v. Goodman, 241 App.
Div. 290, 271 N. Y. Supp. 500 (1st Dep't 1934) (plaintiff's signed general consent to any treatment
found necessary protected surgeon who operated for hernia on left side upon finding it was more
critical than right side hernia for which operation had been requested). And see cases collected in
Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 695, 717-19 (1957).
Typical of the broad language in such general consent forms currently in use in Denver is the following: "I hereby give my consent to Dr.
a member of the staff of
--.....
hospital, to perform upon me any operation which in his judgment he deems necessary."
40 Prosser, Torts 84 (1955); Restatement, Torts § 62, Illustrations 5 & 6 (1934); Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d
695, 699-704 (1957).
41 E.g., Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1951); Restatement, Torts § 54 (1934).
42 But cf. Green v. Jones, 136 Colo. 512, 319 P.2d 1083 (1957) (two-year old child held incapable
of consenting to ride as guest in grandmother's car, and therefore not subject to guest statute defense).
43 Regan, Doctor and Patient and the Low 77 (3d ed. 1956).
44 Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954).
45 Id. at 78, 266 P.2d at 1098.
46 Id. at 79, 266 P.2d at 1098 (a not unlikely story).
47 Summarizing testimony, the court declared: "He admits, however, that he did not specify a
circumcision operation, and that he just mentioned an operation." 129 Colo. at 79, 266 P.2d at 1098.
Thus the court indicated its conclusion that the plaintiff was not a discriminating shopper but was
willing to take any operation in stock.
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he referred, because of Mrs. Smith's apparent difficulty in understanding what he meant, as the 'tube-tying' operation, and that she
replied that was the operation to be done."48
The best that can be inferred from this evidence is that in performing an operation upon Mr. Smith the physician relied upon
Mrs. Smith's choice of the operation to be performed even though
she was apparently having difficulty in understanding what operation was being discussed. Inescapable is the conclusion that Mr.
Smith, who was sterilized, never at any time personally consented
to be sterilized. Yet, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court
action in directing a plaintiff's verdict on liability and held that this
evidence presented a jury issue whether the plaintiff had consented
to the vasectomy.
Generally speaking it is prudent procedure to obtain the consent of both husband and wife if either is to be sterilized. 9 But if
the Smith case be law in Colorado, a doubtful hypothesis, it is not
necessary to obtain the consent of the husband, but only of the
wife, if the husband is to be sterilized.5 0 Happily for the male animal and for unborn generations, the case is unique and probably
will never be followed on this point.
C. Negligence
The theory by far most important, because nearly all medical
malpractice cases are based upon it, is negligence. Because of its
paramount significance, a major portion of this paper will be devoted to the negligence theory.
III. NEGLIGENT

MALPRACTICE

Those who engage in the healing professions, no more nor less
than other men, may be liable in tort for damages caused others
by their negligence. It has been said that: "Negligence in actions
of this nature is no different than in other situations. It consists
of doing something, which, under the circumstances, should not
have been done, or in omitting to do that which should have been
done."'" While this generality is not untrue, it is incomplete. Medical
malpractice law, although it is but an application of general negligence principles in a specific frame of reference, presents some
special legal problems. Problems concerning the standard of care
imposed upon practitioners, the specific acts or omissions which
may be deemed negligence, and the burden of proving negligence
48 129 Colo. at 79, 266 P.2d at 1098.
49 Regan, op. cit. supra note 43. This is a statement of minimum precaution, and it assumes
that the sterilization is a lawful operation. Present Colorado law apparently provides no express
authority for performing a non-therapeutic sterilization, and some authorities have warned that even
the consent of both spouses may not protect from civil, and possibly criminal, liability, a surgeon
sterilizing either spouse in a state where the operation is unlawful. Miller and Dean, Liability of
Physicians for Sterilization Operations, 16 A.B.A.J. 158 (1930); Smith, Antecedent Grounds of Liability in the Practice of Surgery, 14 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 233, 276-84 (1942). Regan, Malpractice and the
Physician, 147 A.M.A.J. 54 (1951). On the state of the low in Colorado, see letter from William L.
Boatright, Attorney General, to Dr. F. H. Zimmerman, Acting Superintendent, State Hospital, Pueblo,
Colorado, Aug. 30, 1928. And see Address by George E. Hall, Staff Associate, American Medic6l Association Law Department, to Congress on Medical Education and Licensure at Chicago, ill., Feb. 7,
1955.
5o How many "barefoot and pregnant" wives would cheerfully "make all arrangements" to give
such operations to their husbands, perhaps as presents for Father's Dayl
51 Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 81, 266 P.2d 1095, 1099 (1954).
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in this kind of case are of particular significance. These problems
will be discussed separately in the order indicated.
A. The Standard of Care
Generally speaking, negligence is conduct which falls below
a standard established by law to protect others from an unreasonable risk of harm. 52 A doctor, like any other man, may be liable
for injury to another proximately caused by his "failure to exercise that degree of care, prudence and forethought, which an ordinarily careful and prudent person would exercise under the same
or similar circumstances. '53 This standard governs the physician as
a man in his non-professional contacts with other men.
His conduct in the capacity of doctor is another matter. In
addition to the minimum standard which all men must meet, men
who hold themselves out to the public as having special skill, training and knowledge in a particular profession must meet a higher
standard imposed only on those who follow that profession.5 4 The
special standard imposed on members of the medical profession
has been oft repeated in Colorado cases.
In a 1957 case the Supreme Court reaffirmed its adherence
to the long established standard that, "A physician is bound to
accord his patients such reasonable care, skill and diligence as
physicians in good standing in the same neighborhood in the same
general line of practice ordinarily have and exercise in like
cases." 55
Earlier Colorado cases had not restricted the standard to the
same neighborhood, but had measured a defendant's act by whether
it would have been considered good medical practice in the same or
similar localities.5 6 The distinction might have practical importance
in a case involving conduct of a doctor practicing in an area where
all doctors have been negligent in keeping abreast of developments
in the profession.
That others also are negligent is not ordinarily a
5 7
defense.
The trend of later cases from other jurisdictions is to recognize
as too narrow the standard of the "same locality" and substitute
the phrase "the same or similar localities." 58 This broader rule may
work to the advantage of a physician charged with negligence for
using a treatment not in general use in his own community. He
may be ahead of his fellows in adopting a new development already
proven through wide use in similar localities. Such leadership
should not be considered negligence.
Nevertheless the law continues to take into account the differ52 Restatement, Torts § 282 (1934).
53 Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 81, 266 P.2d 1095, 1099 (1954); Prasser, Torts 124 (1955).
54 For a very recent treatment of the special rules applying to physicians, pharmacists, architects,
ngne er,

teachers,

attorneys,

abstractors,

funeral

directors,

and

accountants,

see

A

Symposium

on

Professional Negligence, 12 Vond. L. Rev. 535-839 (1959).
55 Foose v. Haymond, 135 Colo. 275, 283, 310 P.2d 722, 726 (1957).
56 E.g., Tadlock v. Lloyd, 65 Colo. 40, 42, 173 Pac. 200, 201 (1918). This view was incorporated in
an instruction approved in Dixon v. Norberg, 113 Colo. 352, 357, 157 P.2d 131, 133 (1945).
57 "Even an entire industry, by adopting careless methods to save time and effort or money, cannot
be permitted to set its own uncontrolled standard." Prosser, Torts 136 (1955). In Weiss v. Axler, 137
Colo. 544, 328 P.2d 88 (1958), the court held that custom and usage in applying a hair wave product
could not affect the test of due care if the usage foiled to comply with the manufacturer's directions
for use of his product.
58 Prosser, Torts 134 (1955).
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ences in opportunities and facilities in dissimilar communities and
recognizes that the country doctor cannot be held to the standard
applied to him who practices in a metropolitan medical center.5 9 So
too the law recognizes that a general practitioner cannot be expected to have as much skill or knowledge as a specialist 60
In some cases the plaintiff admits that the defendant doctor
was both careful and skillful in carrying out the treatment given,
but claims that he was negligent in the first instance in choosing
the wrong treatment procedure. In such a case the key issue of
negligence depends on whether the treatment selected was one
which reasonably skilled, prudent and careful practitioners in the
same or similar localities would have approved for the plaintiff's
62
ailment.6 1 Only expert testimony can establish this standard.
The last mentioned standard applies only to negligence in the
choice of treatment for an ailment whose proper treatment is well
established among medical men at the time the defendant acts.
Where the medical authorities are not in accord on the proper treatment or where no effective procedures have been proven by legitimate experimentation, the physician is free to exercise his own
judgment. With wise restraint, the law refuses to interfere with
that judgment, lest physicians be deterred from exerting their best
efforts in doubtful cases. An 1895 Colorado case stated the rule,
which is still good law,6 3 that, "in a case involving doubt, or when
there are reasonable grounds for a difference of opinion as to the
nature of the disease and the proper mode of treatment, if a physician or surgeon possessing the requisite qualifications applies his
best skill and judgment, with ordinary care and diligence, to the
examination and treatment of a case, he is not responsible for an
honest mistake or error of judgment as to the character of the disease or the best mode of treatment."64 This is a sensible rule and
one which avoids imposing on physicians a stricter standard of
liability than that imposed on other professional men.
In interpreting the rule concerning errors of judgment, the
Colorado court has been most reluctant to second-guess the physician and most lenient in giving him the benefit of the doubt.6 5 For
example, in a 1937 case where five physicians condemned the procedure followed by the defendant, but ten others approved it, the
high court reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff and ordered
a non-suit without a new trial. " ' It would seem that in such a case
there is at least a question of fact for the jury, especially when
one considers how difficult it is to get even one physician to fully
express his real feelings in an action against another doctor.
59 Ibid.
60 See Dixon v. Norberg, 113 Colo. 352, 357, 157 P.2d 131, 133 (1945); Prosser, Torts 133 (1955).
61 See the discussion in text at notes 94-99 infro and authorities there cited. Even a treatment procedure amounting to criminal misconduct cannot be held to be medical malpractice without expert
testimony that it violated the usual standards of care. See McKay v. State Board, 103 Colo. 305, 311-13,
86 P.2d 232, 236 (1938).
62 Norkett v. Martin, 63 Colo. 220, 165 Pac. 256 (1917); McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Colo. App. 163, 171,
128 Pac. 870, 873 (1912).
63 See, e.g.,Gleason v. McKeehan, 100 Colo. 194, 66 P.2d 808 (1937); Brown v. Hughes, 94 Colo.
295, 30 P.2d 259 (1934).
64 Jackson v. Burnham, 20 Colo. 532, 539, 39 Pac. 577, 579 (1895).
65 Cases citednote 62 supro. "While it is true that physicians 'are not responsible for the errors
of an enlightened judgment where good judgments may differ, ...
they will be charged . . . only
where such errors could not have arisen except from want of reasonable skill and diligence.' " Jackson
v. Burnham, 20 Colo. 532, 537-38, 39 Pac. 577, 579 (1895).
66 Gleason v. McKeehan, 100 Colo. 194, 66 P.2d 808 (1937).
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Whether the present Supreme Court would be inclined to take
such a case from the jury is at best a matter of conjecture.
Honest mistake of judgment is available as a defense only if it
appears that the physician used reasonable care in exercising that
judgment. 7 One who has the utmost skill and learning may nevertheless be liable if he fails to apply his ability in gathering facts
on which to base a judgment of the treatment to follow. 6 8 Whether
reasonable care is employed in exercising judgment is usually a
question of fact for the jury.69
The rule restricting medical practitioners to the use of proven
and generally recognized methods of treatment is intended to protect the public against injury through unwarranted experimentation with new methods and untried theories. At this point it is important to note two Colorado cases which espouse a novel test of
negligence for cases where the treatment procedure is questioned.
In Brown v. Hughes70 the 1934 court, without citing any authority,
declared: "The defendants herein must first have left and abandoned all knowledge acquired in the fields of exploration and
adopted some rash or experimental methods before they approached
the danger zone of liability."' 71 In the court's words, the issue was,
"Does the evidence here evince want of skill or a reckless disregard of consequences?" 72 The error was compounded by repetition
in another case three years later.73 In the latter case the court concluded that the jury had no right to find the defendant liable for
a death following an operation condemned by five medical witnesses. Said the opinion: "The defendant did not undertake a
wholly new experiment but, according to the evidence, followed
a method that had previously been used with success by himself,
and a procedure-admittedly rare--but known to have been sometimes used. '74 Certainly the law should be reluctant to stifle new
methods and improved treatments but the test laid down in these
two cases requires that a plaintiff prove what is tantamount to gross
negligence if not willful wrongdoing. Considering that in this kind
of case the only proof acceptable must come from the defendant's
fellow practitioners, the practical impossibility of meeting such a
test is obvious. It is submitted that these two cases are without
foundation in reason, policy or law and should be repudiated at
the first opportunity.
In addition it must be borne in mind that in determining
whether a particular procedure is medically approved, the question must be answered according to the tenets of the school of
practice to which the defendant belongs. 75 Under this rule an osteopath's procedures and treatments are to be tested against the standard of methods among osteopaths. 76 It follows that what is negligence if done by a medical doctor may not be negligence when
done by a chiropractor and vice versa. This is a judicial recogni67 Foase v. Haymond, 135 Colo. 275, 283, 310 P.2d 722, 727 (1957).
68 Jackson v. Burnham, 20 Colo. 532, 538, 39 Pac. 577, 579 (1895).
69 See, e.g., Foose v. Hayrfiond, 135 Colo. 275, 283, 310 P.2d 722, 727 (1957).
70 94 Colo. 295, 30 P.2d 259 (1934).
71 Id. at 303, 30 P.2d at 262.
72 Ibid.
73 Gleason v. McKeehan, 100 Colo. 194, 197, 66 P.2d 808, 809 (1937).
74 Id.'at 202, 66 P.2d at 811.
75 Bolles v. Kinton, 83 Colo. 147, 150-51, 263 Pac. 26, 27 (1928) (osteopaths).
76 Ibid. And see McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Colo. App. 163, 128 Pac. 870 (1912).
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tion that medicine is yet an incomplete science and no one school
of practitioners has a monopoly on knowledge of effective treatment methods. Furthermore, one must not forget that methods
forbidden by the standards in one type of locality may be quite acceptable in another. It should be noted, however, that the trend of
later cases from other states is toward holding all who practice the
healing arts close to the high standards of the medical profession
proper. These cases reason that advances in medical knowledge,
combined with tremendous improvements in communications
media, make it easier for all practitioners regardless of locality or
school of practice 77 to have the minimum knowledge required to
protect the public.
These standards of care can best be understood by considering
instances where the Supreme Court has applied them to particular
acts or omissions claimed to constitute negligence.
B. Acts or Omissions Constituting Negligence
It is of course elemental, in this context as elsewhere, that
"negligence may consist of either wrongful action or wrongful inaction. ' '78 Stated another way, a physician's negligence may consist "in his doing something which he should not have done, or in
'
omitting to do something which he should have done."79
Negligent omission. Plaintiffs in Colorado cases have alleged
negligence through inaction in the form of failure properly to
diagnose an ailment 0 or injury,"' failure to X-ray where a possible
fracture was indicated,8 2 failure to direct immobilization of a fractured limb 3 and failure, after setting a fractured bone, to use reasonable
care to ascertain whether it has remained in proper posi4
tion.1
In one suit the claimant alleged, but could not prove, that the
attending physician had been asked to bring a specialist into the
case but had failed or refused to do so.85 A somewhat similar early
case held that a physician called to treat the plaintiff for typhoid
fever was not guilty of malpractice in failing to comply with the
latter's request that an oculist be brought into the case to treat a
serious eye condition, at least in absence of proof that the typhoid
fever had caused the eye ailment. 8
Occasionally, the threat of legal liability may interfere with
good medical practice. Such an instance might occur where a physician decides that for medical reasons it would be better if the
patient does not immediately realize the gravity of his condition.
If the serious condition improves or disappears this will be considered good therapy. But if not, the doctor may be sued by an
77 McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 Vand. L Rev. 549, 569-81 (1959).
78 Pearson v. Norman, 106 Colo. 396, 399, 106 P.2d 361, 363 (1940).
79 McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Colo. App. 163, 169, 128 Pac. 870, 873 (1912).
8o Jackson v. Burnham, 20 Colo. 532, 39 Pac. 577 (1895) (improper diagnosis of penis infection
resulting in gangrene and amputation of penis).
81 Foose v. Haymond, 135 Colo. 275, 310 P.2d 722 (1957) (diagnosis of foot fracture as sprain);
Coakley v. Hayes, 121 Colo. 304, 215 P.2d 901 (1950) (plaintiff failed to prove alleged failure to
diagnose and treat displaced cervical vertebra); Bonnet v. Foote, 47 Colo. 282, 107 Pac. 252 (1910)
(fracture diagnosed as bruise); McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Colo. App. 163, 128 Pac. 870 (1912) (fractured arm
diagnosed as dislocated shoulder).
82 Foqse v. Haymond, 135 Colo. 275, 310 P.2d 722 (1957) (fracture diagnosed, without X-ray, as
sprain); Bolles v. Kinton, 83 Colo. 147, 263 Pac. 26 (1928) (hip fracture diagnosed as contusion in spite
of perceptible shortening of leg and inversion of foot).
83 Foose v. Haymand, supra note 82; McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Colo. App. 163, 128 Pac. 870 (1912).
84 Croghead v. McCullough, 58 Colo. 485, 146 Pac. 235 (1915).
85 Cody v. Fraser, 122 Colo. 252, 222 P.2d 422 (1950).
ae Jones v. Vroom, 8 Colo. App. 143, 45 Pac. 234 (1896) (of doubtful precedent value today).
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irate patient claiming that the condition was not diagnosed properly or that it was negligence not to fully inform him of the seriousness of his malady.17 Similarly it may be alleged as the basis
of a claim that upon discharge the physician neglected to inform
the patient that further treatment would be required.8 Courts in
other jurisdictions have frequently stated "that the relation between
the physician and his patient is a fiduciary one and therefore the
physician has an obligation to make a full and frank disclosure to
the patient of all pertinent facts related to his illness."8 9
Negligent omission may involve occurrences having neither
relation to nor bearing upon the physician's technical skill. Thus it
is obvious negligence for a surgeon to allow an unconscious patient
to roll off an operating table quite without regard to the standard
of skill and care observed by the" surgeon while actually performing the surgery.9 0 Likewise failure to take the minimum precautions
necessary to assure that the patient gets the operation intended for
him and not that requested by another would seem to present a clear
case of negligence. 9 1
Finally, in the category of negligent malpractice by omission
would fall the cases where it is charged that the patient's condition
was unnecessarily aggravated or death resulted because of the physician's general inattention and failure to respond to urgent requests for aid.9 2 Although a doctor may have no legal duty to undertake care of a particular patient in the first instance, once he
commences treatment he "cannot discharge a case and relieve himfor it simply by staying away without
self of the responsibility
93
notice to the patient.
Negligent affirmative acts. Colorado cases have dealt with two
distinct kinds of affirmative action constituting negligent malpractice. The first type consists of adopting a procedure or prescribing
a treatment other than the procedures and treatments generally
considered acceptable and effective remedies for the disease or injury involved.9 4 If an unproven or otherwise unacceptable method
is chosen and injury results, the physician may be liable even
though, once adopted, the procedure is carried out with the utmost
care and skill. Thus a doctor who prescribed a poultice instead of
the usual minor surgery was required to pay damages in spite of
his plea that at most he was guilty of an honest mistake on a matter
of judgment.9 5 Similarly, a surgeon and dentist who co-operated in
87 See, e.g., Pearson v. Norman, 106 Colo. 396, 106 P.2d 361 (1940) (physician claimed he properly
diagnosed and treated spine fracture but admitted he did not tell patient, his wife or his son of the
condition; patient claimed physician had diagnosed and treated injury as "a bad bruise and shake-up").
See Taylor, Doctor's Duty to Speak, 24 The Linacre Quarterly 67 (1957).
88 E.g., Cady v. Fraser, 122 Colo. 252, 255, 222 P.2d 422, 424 (1950).
89 McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 549, 586 (1959).
go Beadles v. Metayka, 135 Colo. 366, 311 P.2d 711 (1957).
91 But cf. Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954).
92 See, e.g., Tadlock v. Lloyd, 65 Colo. 40, 173 Pac. 200 (1918) (physician admitted child's life might
have been saved had he received proper attention when it was first asked).
93 Bolles v. Kinton, 83 Colo. 147, 149, 263 Pc. 26, 27 (1928) (physician held jointly liable for
iegligence of another to whom case had been turned over).
The facts of this leading case are
94 E.g., Jackson v. Burnham, 20 Colo. 532, 39 Pac. 577 (1895)
set out in note 95 infra.
95 Jackson v. Burnham, supro note 94. There the plaintiff, suffcring pain from a swollen penis,
sought the defendant physician's care. Examination disclosed that the foreskin was adhering to the
head of the penis, causing a constriction or strangulation and preventing proper circulation of blood.
The usual and accepted treatment for this unhappy condition was to slit the foreskin, thus eliminating
constriction and restoring circulation. Instead of following that procedure, however, the defendant
applied and kept on the argon a tight "flaxseed meal poultice" which further constricted the organ
causing gangrene and eventual amputation. Held: Jury verdict of $5,000 for the plaintiff affirmed.
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administering a general anaesthetic to a patient known to have a
weak heart and then extracted his tonsils plus sixteen impacted
teeth, failed to convince a jury they were not liable for the patient's
death.96
The procedure adopted must be appropriate to the case at hand,
and thus the question of proper diagnosis may overlap the problem
of choice of treatment. A method considered safe for removing
foreign objects from the throat may not be approved for removing
them from the esophagus. 97 Measures effective for dislocated
shoulders may not be advisable for fractured arms.9 8
Whether a particular procedure or treatment is acceptable must
be proved as part of the plaintiff's case and generally the only acceptable evidence is expert medical testimony. 99
In a second and more common form of malpractice by affirmative negligence, the negligence involved is not the adoption of an
incorrect diagnosis or treatment but consists of performing an approved procedure in a careless or otherwise substandard manner.
Thus where a physician in treating a fractured collar bone employed the proper method but so carelessly set the bone that the
fragments overlapped causing a crippling deformity, it was held
that a verdict for the patient was justified. 10 This form of negligence may occur in diagnosis'0 1 or in treatment. 10 2 For example, in a
given case proper diagnostic examination might justify use of an
X-ray, but if serious burns result, a jury might conclude that the
X-ray was improperly used. 103 Colorado case law examples of affirmative negligence in treatment range from maladministration of
drugs 10 4 to tearing of the patient's esophagus
while attempting to
0
remove a bone lodged in her throat.'
This type of affirmative negligence frequently occurs where
an approved surgical operation is performed in a negligent manner. Thus where the surgeon performing an appendectomy severs
the patient's intestine, 10 6 or otherwise cuts 10 7 or injures 0 8 some
part of the anatomy not properly involved in the intended operation,
the negligence may sometimes be obvious even to a layman and no
expert testimony should be required to establish negligence.
96 Brown v. Hughes, 94 Colo. 295, 30 P.2d 259 (1934) (but the Supreme Court reversed, finding no
evidence the defendants' acts caused the death).
97 Dixon v. Norberg, 113 Colo. 352, 157 P.2d 131 (1945).
98 McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Colo. App. 163, 128 Pac. 870 (1912).
99 See note 62 supra. A recent illustration of how difficult it is to obtain clear medical testimony
to establish the point appears in Foose v. Haymond, 135 Colo. 275, 282-83, 310 P.2d 722, 725-26
(1957).
100 Craghead v. McCullough, 58 Cola. 485, 146 Pac. 235 (1915); Bonnet v. Foote, 47 Colo. 282, 107
Pac. 252 (1910) (fracture diagnosed and treated as mere bruise).
101 See, e.g., Coakley v. Hayes, 121 Colo. 303, 215 P.2d 901 (1950).
102 See notes 104 and 105 infra.
103 Lamme v. Ortega, 129 Colo. 149, 267 P.2d 1115 (1954) (Supreme Court reversed jury verdict
for failure of plantiff to prove injury was caused by X-ray).
104 Hedgpeth v. Schoen, 109 Colo. 341, 125 P.2d 632 (1942) (injection of arsenic solution in
treating trenchmouth).
105 Dixon v. Norberg, 113 Colo. 352, 157 P.2d 131 (1945) ($7,000 verdict for plaintiff upheld).
106 Edwards v. Quackenbush, 112 Colo. 337, 149 P.2d 809 (1944) ($18,000 jury verdict for the
plaintiff upheld).
107 Cf. Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954) (plaintiff claimed he had asked for
circumcision but was given a sterilization operation by mistake).
108 See McBrayer v. Zordel, 127 Colo. 443, 257 P.2d 962 (1953).
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Of like kind are the cases where surgeons have left foreign
objects inside patients," 9 cases once so numerous as to evoke from
the Colorado court the comment that, "Their perusal would almost
lead to the conclusion that certain surgeons use such incisions as
waste baskets." 110 In such cases also the negligence is manifest.
Even proof by the defendant surgeon that a sponge count came
out correctly may not be conclusive to clear him."' It follows that
if the surgeon had notice immediately following the operation that
the sponge count did not check, his inaction112thereafter would seem
to constitute strong evidence of negligence.
One need not spend years in medical school or specialized
practice to discern that in cases such as these somebody has been
negligent. 113 They are not unlike the classic Mississippi case where
the court, with typical Southern reserve, declared: "We can
imagine no reason why, with ordinary care, human toes could not
be left out of chewing tobacco, and if toes are found in chewing
tobacco, it seems to us that somebody has been very careless." 1 4 To
paraphrase, the layman can imagine no reason why, with ordinary
care, sponges and surgical instruments cannot be left out of human
beings, and if such foreign objects are found in a patient after an
operation, it would appear that somebody has been negligent. This
of course involves the very practical problem of the plaintiff's burden of proving negligence and the extent to which that burden may
be lightened by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

IV.

BuRDi

AND M"tNuER OF PRooF

A. Proof by Expert Testimony
In many medical malpractice cases the plaintiff has the
burden of proving the standard of care as part of his case." If he
fails to prove the standard, the case cannot go to the jury,
for the jury will not be allowed to set up a standard of its
own. 116 This rule applies where it is claimed that the defendant
-

109 E.g., Smedra v. Stanek, 187 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1951); Davis v. Bonebroke, 135 Colo. 506,
313 P.2d 982 (1957); Rosane v. Senger, note 110 infro.
110 Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 368, 149 P.2d 372, 374 (1944).
1n Daly v. Lininger, 87 Colo. 401, 406, 288 Pac. 633, 636 (1930) (dictum).
1125ee Smedra v. Stanek, 187 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1951) (trial court erred in refusing to admit
evidence that just after the operation a nurse informed surgeon that the sponge count did not come
out right, and in rejecting testimony of a statement by surgeon that he had been delayed in surgery
because count did not check).
113 See the discussion in Daly v. Lininger, 87 Colo. 401, 405-07, 288 Pac. 633, 636 (1930).
114 Pillars v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365, 366 (1918).
115 Norkett v. Martin, 63 Colo. 220, 165 Pac. 256 (1917); McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Colo. App. 163, 171.
128 POc. 870, 873 (1912).

118 Ibid.
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has employed a treatment not generally recognized in the profession. Here the essence of the negligence is in deciding to do
what was done, not in the manner of doing it, and obviously a lay
witness cannot say whether doctors generally would react to particular symptoms by employing a particular procedure, operation or
medication. In such cases, therefore, the standard to be applied by
the trier of facts must be established by expert medical testimony,
and cannot be otherwise established. 117 Furthermore, if different
schools of medicine recognize different standards or methods of
treating a particular condition, the expert testimony required
should come from adherents of the school which the defendant
follows.1" 8 Defendants should be careful lest in seeking to exculpate
themselves by describing their usual methods and precautions they
incidentally provide the plaintiff with otherwise unobtainable expert testimony establishing a standard. 1 9
Once the standard of care has been established by medical testimony, the plaintiff must produce evidence that it has been violated.
If the case concerns a charge that the defendant engaged in a medically unacceptable procedure, the necessary expert evidence will
often take the form of answers to hypothetical questions. For example, in Dixon v. Norberg12 0 the plaintiff claimed that her esophagus had been injured by the defendant's unorthodox procedure in
trying to remove a pork bone which had lodged there. After the
plaintiff testified describing her condition, the defendant's treatment procedure, and the resulting injury, the plaintiff's attorney
called medical witnesses to establish that the defendant's procedure
in the case constituted negligence. These medical specialists, "in
answer to hypothetical questions, testified that, assuming the existence of a bone in the esophagus and a probing for it in the manner
related by plaintiff, such a procedure was not good practice considering the present standards in the profession for a general practitioner and would be dangerous to the patient.' 12 1 Similar procedure has been followed in other cases requiring expert evidence.
Occasionally the courts have mentioned the practical difficulties
encountered by plaintiffs seeking expert testimony. 122 It is natural
for medical men, out of empathy or sympathy, to be reluctant to
testify against a colleague embroiled in legal difficulties. But it is
difficult to understand the usual explanation to the effect that a
code of ethics forbids such testimony. For professional men whose
first duty is to the patients they serve to refuse to testify fully
and frankly in order to right a wrong against one of those patients
is bad enough. But to so refuse on the ground that to tell the truth
117 Ibid. In Daly v. Lininger, 87 Colo. 401, 405, 288 Pac. 633, 636 (1930), the Colorado court
quoted with apparent approval as follows: "It is true that there is a large class of malpractice
cases in which the question or matter under investigation is so intricate and abstruse, or so little
understood, that ordinary jurors would in all probability know nothing about the same, but must
be guided by opinions of witnesses having special knowledge. In this class of cases the plaintiff fails
to make a case for the jury in the absence of a properly qualified expert witness."
118 Bolles v. Kinton, 83 Colo. 147, 263 Pac. 26 (1928) (osteopaths).
119 This happened in Bolles v. Kinton, supra note 118. The defendant's admission eliminated the
plaintiff's burden on this point in Pearson v. Norman, 106 Colo. 396, 106 P.2d 361 (1940).
120 113 Colo. 352, 157 P.2d 131 (1945).
121 Id. at 356, 157 P.2d at 133.
122 See, e.g., Todloik v. Lloyd, 65 Colo. 40, 44, 173 Poc. 200, 202 (1918). A nationwide survey
indicated that "only about 15 per cent of all doctors would be willing to tell a patient he had been
injured by the negligent treatment of another doctor. Only about 7 per cent would agree to appear
voluntarily as a witness for such a patient in court." Silverman, supra note 1 at 116.
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would be unethical compounds the original wrong and perverts the
meaning of ethics. No self-respecting lawyer seeks from any witness, medical or otherwise, anything but the truth.1 23 No self-respecting doctor should suppress the truth, even if it happens to be
evidence in a lawsuit against another doctor. In the long run the
"conspiracy of silence" among medical men will hurt them far more
than it will help them. This is already obvious in the form of judicial departures from the once universal rule requiring expert testimony to establish negligence in a malpractice case.
B. Proof Without Expert Testimony
All too often attorneys, frustrated by the near impossibility of
obtaining medical testimony to establish the standard of care and
the fact of negligence, advise against pursuing a well founded claim
or settle for far less than the case is worth. This may be a mistake.
There is abundant Colorado authority recognizing that in certain
types of medical malpractice cases no expert evidence is required
to establish negligence. 24 Only where the negligence charged is
that the defendant treated the injury or disease by a procedure or
operation not acceptable to his own school must the standard of
care be established solely by medical testimony. 2 '
On the other hand, where it is alleged that a procedure admittedly proper for the ailment involved has been negligently performed, and the matter under investigation is so simple that laymen as well as experts can understand it, negligence may be established without medical testimony. 26 Indeed, it may even be error
to admit expert testimony in some cases of this nature.1 2 7 Thus
where an oral surgeon continued to operate after profuse bleeding
had blocked his vision, and he accidentally severed a nerve, it was
held prejudicial error to instruct the jury that only expert evidence could be considered in determining whether the defendant
had been negligent. 128 Again, where an osteopath treating a stiff
neck employed the procedure generally approved by osteopaths,
i.e., manipulation, but applied force so great that paralysis immediately resulted, it was not necessary for another osteopath to explain to the jury that there may have been negligence.'2 9
In cases where it is possible to prove negligence without expert
testimony or by a combination of expert and lay testimony, the
quantum of evidence necessary to take the case to the jury is no
greater than in other kinds of cases. Any pertinent evidence having a fair tendency to sustain the alleged negligence will suffice
for this purpose.2 0
123 This was acknowledged recently by a noted surgeon and authority on malpractice. Wesson,
Medical Malpractice Suits: A Physician's Primer for Defendants, 8 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 254, 255 (1959).
124 E.g., Farrah v. Patton, 99 Colo. 41, 59 P.2d 76 (1936); Daly v. Lininger, 87 Cola. 401, 288 Pac.
633 (1930).
125 Cases cited notes 115 and 124 supra.
126 Daly v. Lininger, 87 Colo. 401, 407, 288 Pac. 633, 636 (1930). "But there is an obvious distinction between a dlim of negligence in the choice of methods of treatment and a charge of negligence
in the actual performance of the work or treatment after such choice is made . . . . As to the
second-a charge of negligent performance-where there is any evidence tending to show such negligence the case is for the jury, as in other cases of negligence, whenever upon the evidence the minds
of reasonable men might differ." Farrah v. Patton, 99 Colo. 41, 45-46, 59 P.2d 76, 78 (1936).
127 See Farrah v. Patton, 99 Colo. 41, 45, 59 P.2d 76, 78 (1936) (dictum); Daly v. Lininger, 87
Colo. 401, 405-06, 288 Pac. 633, 636 (1930) (dictum).
128 Daly v. Lininger, 87 Colo. 401, 408-09, 288 Pac. 633, 637 (1930).
129 Farrah v. Patton, 99 Colo. 41, 59 P.2d 76 (1936).
1.0 Id. at 44, 59 P.2d at 77, Daly v. Lininger, 87 Colo. 401, 407, 288 Pac. 633, 636 (1930).
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However, it has long been established that mere proof that the
patient died or that the treatment failed is no evidence whatever of
the physician's negligence. 3 ' This follows from the previously discussed rule that in absence of expression contrary, a physician does
not warrant a cure or favorable result. 23 Thus it has been held that
proof that an injured limb is defective after. treatment is not evidence of negligent treatment.' 33 Nor was the death of a cardiac
patient following a combined tonsilectomy and wholesale extraction
of teeth considered evidence of negligence.'"
Occasionally, even in cases where it would seem to the layman
that the injury could not have occurred in the ordinary course of
events without negligence, the Colorado court has required a high
degree of precision and detail in the plaintiff's evidence of negligence. This reached an extreme in the 1953 case of McBrayer v.
ZOrdel.1:1;5 There a four-year-old girl sued a surgeon and anesthetist for loss of four teeth knocked out during a tonsilectomy. The
plaintiff's evidence included testimony that immediately prior to
the operation the teeth had been sound and strong. This the surgeon
admitted. In addition the plaintiff's mother and father testified
that immediately after the operation the surgeon and anesthetist
placed the blame for the occurrence upon each other. At the trial
both doctors denied this and each claimed he had no idea how the
teeth were loosened. For the defendants, ten experts testified that
during such operations baby teeth are often knocked out even
though reasonable care is used.
The trial jury found for the plaintiff, but on writ of error the
Supreme Court not only reversed but ordered the complaint dismissed. This disposition of the case was based in part upon the
Supreme Court's view that there was no evidence of any negligence
to take the case to the jury. Said the court, "it was not shown by
any evidence exactly how the incident occurred, and neither of the
operating doctors seemed to know, but said that without any apparent cause or reason, it happened frequently in such operations."' ; Such a result is quite acceptable to anyone willing to
suppose that four firm and healthy teeth (not properly involved in
any operation) are quite likely to drop out of a child's mouth simultaneously and of their own accord while the child is lying immobile. ' 37 That supposition is as reasonable as expecting a fouryear-old child who was unconscious at the time of the occurrence
to describe in detail "exactly how the incident occurred . . ."I" when
two physicians who were present, conscious, and presumably attentive claimed they didn't know how it happened. In a not dissimilar leading California case where five doctors and hospital per13t Brown v. Hughes, 94 Colo. 295, 306, 30 P.2d 259, 263 (1934); Locke v. Van Wyke, 91 Colo.
14, 20, 11 P.2d 563, 565 (1932). "God forbid that the low should apply any rule so rigorous and
unjust as that to the relations and responsibilities arising out of this noble and humane profession ....
If . . . failure to cure were held to be evidence, however slight, of negligence on the part of the
physician or surgeon, causing the bad result, few would be courageous enough to practice the healing art, for they would have to assume a financial responsibilitv for nearly all the ills that
flesh is heir to." McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Colo. App. 163, 170, 128 Poc. 870, 873-74 (1912).
132 See text at note 20 supro.
133 McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Colo. App. 163, 128 Pac. 870 (1912).
134 Brown v. Hughes, 94 Colo. 295, 30 P.2d 259 (1934).
135 127 Colo. 438, 257 P.2d 962 (1953).
136 Id. at 443, 257 P.2d at 965 (emphasis added).
137 " 'If the low supposes that' said Mr. Bumble, 'the law is a ass, a idiot.' " Dickens, Oliver
Twist.

138 127 Colo. at 443, 257 P.2d at 965.
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sonnel were present when a patient rendered unconscious for an
appendectomy somehow received a shoulder injury, and all five
were unable or unwilling to explain how the injury occurred, all
were held liable."1 9 Thus did one of the nation's leading courts express its exasperation at the "conspiracy of silence."
Happily the present Colorado court does not seem to require
detailed evidence of specific negligent acts in similar cases where
inferring from the result that someone must
a layman is justified 14in
0
have been negligent.
C. Res Ipsa Loquitur
Any meaningful discussion at this date of the Colorado res
ipsa loquitur doctrine must begin and end with the truly remarkable 1958 case of Weiss v. Axler. 4 ' Although not a medical malpractice case, Weiss' broad interpretation and liberal application of
the res ipsa rule provide a precedent of landmark significance for
future malpractice litigation.
In Weiss v. Axler the plaintiff sought damages for loss of her
hair following a permanent wave treatment in the defendant's
beauty salon. Her complaint contained a general allegation of negligence, and in addition averred specific negligence of the beauty
operator either in using too strong a wave solution or in allowing
the solution to remain in the hair too long. As evidence of the specific
negligent acts, the plaintiff testified that the defendant had orally
stated his opinion that the damage had resulted from either too
strong a solution or too long an exposure.
The defendant denied any negligence and denied making the
claimed admission against interest.
Over objection the trial court instructed the jury on the law
governing res ipsa loquitur. The jury found for the plaintiff. On
writ of error, the defendant contended that the case was not a
proper one for application of res ipsa loquitur, especially in view
of the fact that the plaintiff had introduced evidence of specific acts
of negligence and therefore there was no need to infer negligence
occurring in some unknown manner.
139 Ybarra v. Spongard, 93 Cal. App.2d 43, 200 P.2d 445 (1949). The California rationale for
applying res ipso loquitur in the case appears in Ybarra v. Spongard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687
(1944).
140 E.g., Davis v. Bonebrake, 135 Colo. 506, 313 P.2d 982 (1957) (sponge case); Beadles v.
Metayka, 135 Colo. 366, 311 P.2d 711 (1957) (unconscious patient fell off operating table). Accord,
Weiss v. Axler, 137 Colo. 544, 328 P.2d 88 (1958). Compare Edwards v. Quackenbush, 112 Colo. 337,
343-44, 149 P.2d 809, 812 (1944).
141 137 Colo. 544, 328 P.2d 88 (1958), 35 DICTA 307.
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The court, in a scholarly opinion by Mr. Justice Frantz, reviewed the hopelessly confusing and contradictory prior Colorado
case law on res ipsa, then seized the opportunity presented to clear
these muddy waters. Unanimously 142 the court held: (a) the case
was a proper one for application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine,
and (b) evidence of particular acts of -negligence does not preclude
reliance on res ipsa.143 Concerning the procedural effect of res ipsa
loquitur the court declared: (1) whether the doctrine applies to the
particular case is a question of law to be determined by the trial
judge upon the plaintiff's evidence, 144 (2) once the trial judge
determines that the doctrine applies, there arises a "compulsive
presumption of negligence"1 45 which is a presumption of law, not
fact,146 and (3) this presumption shifts the burden of proof (not
merely the burden of going forward with evidence) and is "conclusive as a matter of law"'' 47 unless the defendant satisfies the jury
48 "by
a preponderance of the evidence that he was not negligent.'
"Thus," said the court, "the sole question in a res ipsa loquitur
case is: has the defendant overcome the prima facie case of negligence against him by establishing by evidence satisfactory to the
jury that he was not negligent?"' 49 The presumption is not necessarily destroyed by a mere explanation from the defendant showing how the injury occurred or that he was not negligent. It is for
the jury to decide not only whether the defendant's explanation is
sufficiently convincing to justify exonerating him, but also whether
the defendant's witnesses are worthy of belief. 150
Although the opinion left several questions unanswered, 51 it
certainly represents great progress in a murky area of the law.
More important perhaps, it indicates that the present Supreme
Court believes that a trial should be an effective search for truth
and that where the very nature of an occurrence indicates that
someone must have been careless, the party having best access to
the true facts must bear the onus of producing them or suffer the
consequences.
Does the Weiss v. Axler rationale apply to medical malpractice
cases? A 1912 Colorado Court of Appeals dictum indicated that the
fact that a fractured bone healed in imperfect position could not
be treated as evidence of negligence, and the doctrine of res ipsa
142
143
144
145
146

Mr.
137
Id.
Id.

Justice Day did not participate in the decision.
Colo. at 561, 328 P.2d at 97.
at 558-59, 328 P.2d at 96.
at 559, 328 P.2d at 96.

Ibid.

Ibid.
148 Id. at 559-60, 328 P.2d at 96-97.
149 Id. at 559, 328 P.2d at 97 (emphasis added).
150 Id. at 559-60, 328 P.2d at 97.
151 For example, does the rule that it is for the judge, not the jury, to decide whether res ipso
applies (this determination being made upon the plaintiff's evidence) in effect deprive the defendant
of jury trial on the issue of credibility to be accorded the plaintiff's witnesses? Mr. Justice Frantz
was careful to poiit out that in determining whether the defendant meets the burden of overcoming
the res ipso presumption, the credibility of the defendant's witnesses remains a jury issue. Considering
Judge Frantz's recently demonstrated concern for preserving inviolate the right of jury trial in minor
criminal offenses, it is likely that the Weiss rule will be qualified to assure jury trial on the credibility
of all witnesses. Compare Canon City v. Merris 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958).
A second problem not answered because not raised in Weiss is the question whether, assuming
the plaintiff proves facts upon which the trial judge determines that res ipso applies, and further assuming that the defendant puts in no evidence whatever to explain the occurrence, must the trial
judge direct a verdict in favor of the plaintiff? This result would seem to follow if the presumption
raised is a true presumption of law. However, such a rule would be a distinct minority position, if not
a unique position. Again, the jury would not be able to reject the plaintiff's testimony as untrue.
For a discussion of this second unsettled problem, see Dittman, One Year Review of Evidence, 36
DICTA 53, 55 (1959).
147
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loquitur could not be applied. 152 But this seems to be no more than
a proper application of the well settled rule that153mere proof of an
unfortunate result is not evidence of negligence.
Medical malpractice cases should be treated the same as other
kinds of negligence cases for purposes of determining whether res
ipsa loquitur applies. Professional men should be entitled to the
same legal protections afforded others, 154
and the usual perequisites
for application of res ipsa should apply.
It is doubtful whether res ipsa loquitur could ever apply to a
case where the claimed negligence is that the defendant employed
a procedure not medically approved for the ailment being treated.
Since the only recognized standard of care in such cases depends
upon contemporaneous expert opinions from other doctors practicing in localities similar to that where the alleged negligence occurred, it would seem to follow that the plaintiff's burden to lirove
the standard could not be discharged by res ipsa loquitur. Here the
case would fail to meet the usual condition limiting the doctrine to
cases where the occurrence is "of a kind which ordinarily does not
occur in the absence of someone's negligence .... "I"
However, where the negligence charged is the careless performance of a medically approved procedure, there would seem
to be no objection to applying res ipsa loquitur if the usual conditions are met. For example, what if Weiss v. Axler had involved
not chemical injuries incurred during a hair wave treatment administered by a beauty operator, but similar injuries received during a
scalp treatment administered by a dermatologist? Should the court
have applied a different rule of law?
Some might insist that the 1952 case of St. Luke's Hospital Association v. Long' 56 stands in the way of applying res ipsa loquitur
to medical negligence. There a three year old child, in the hospital
for removal of his tonsils and adenoids, was strangled when he
slipped, while asleep, through the side rails of a hospital bed and
caught his head between them. Although the plaintiffs' evidence
did not show exactly how the unfortunate incident happened, the
defendant, by affirmative evidence, "explained and made known
the cause of the death and disclosed all its knowledge and means
of information as to the accident."'15 The court indicated that on
the plaintiff's evidence alone res ipsa loquitur would have properly
applied, but held that the defendant's full disclosure gave the plaintiffs "equal knowledge and means of information and the res ipsa
doctrine could no longer be invoked.' 15 8 It seems clear that on this
point, i.e., that the defendant's explanation may deprive the plaintiff's res ipsa loquitur case of its character as such a case, Weiss v.
Axler has overruled the Long case.155
152 McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Colo. App. 163, 169, 128
153 See text at note 131 supro and cases cited in
154 The prerequisites for applying the doctrine in
121 Colo. 574, 589-91, 220 P.2d 344, 352 (1950). And
155 Prosser, Torts 201 (1955).
1556 125 Colo. 25, 240 P.2d 917 (1952).
157 Id. at 31, 240 P.2d at 921.

Pac. 870, 873 (1912).
that footnote.
Colorado are set out in Zimmerman v. Franzen,
see Prosser, Torts 201 (1955).

158 Ibid.

159 "The defendant's explanation does not per se destroy the presumption; the conviction of the
jury (or the court in a trial to it) that the exolnnotion exonerates the defendant dissipates the presumption." Weiss v. Axler, 137 Colo. 544, 560, 328 P.2d 88, 97 (1958). This would also seem to follow
from the rule of Weiss that evidence of specific negligence may sometimes co-exist in the case with
the res ipso doctrine. Id. at 561, 328 P.2d at 97.
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In other jurisdictions there is a fast growing body of authority
applying res ipsa loquitur to medical malpractice cases. 160 It may
or may not be significant that one leading California malpractice
case 6 1 applying res ipsa was quoted with approval in Weiss v.
Axler 6-2 and cited with apparent approval in a 1957 Colorado malpractice case which was tried on a res ipsa theory. 163 Thereis no
reason to expect that res ipsa loquitur will not be applied in future
Colorado malpractice cases.
D. Burden of Proving Causation
One final point on the plaintiff's burden of proof deserves
thorough discussion in a separate article and therefore will receive but brief mention here. This is the claimant's obligation to
prove that the defendant's negligent act caused the injuries. Many
a plaintiff's bark has sailed serenely past the straits64 of negligence
only to be wrecked on the rocky coast of causation.'
Proof of causation has a dual aspect. As usual in negligence
cases the legal test of proximate cause must be met. Nearly always
in malpractice cases the additional hurdle of medical cause is present. True, in an occasional case nothing but an identifiable doctor's
negligence could account for the injury, as in some "sponge"
cases. In a rare case, too, the mere proximity in time between
the physician's ministrations and appearance of the patient's
injury symptoms may be sufficient. For example, where
an osteopath suddenly and with great force twisted the plaintiff's
neck, and the plaintiff instantaneously experienced nausea, terrific
pain and paralysis, the Supreme Court felt that causation had been
sufficiently shown to take the case to the jury. 161
In most malpractice cases, however, proof of causation requires
medical testimony. Thus where the question was whether a particular trauma caused an eye infection which did not develop until
several months later, medical testimony that the infection possibly
could have resulted from the trauma was held insufficient to support
a jury verdict. 66 In malpractice cases, as in other personal injury
cases, evidence that the cause-effect relationship is a possibility is
not sufficient;
opinion evidence must indicate at least a probabil16 7
ity.
Once the plaintiff by competent evidence has established that
the defendant's act probably was the efficient cause of the injuries,
it would seem that the defendant would have the burden of going
forward with contrary evidence or with evidence of some other
160 Discussions of the modern cases appear in McCoid, The Core Required of Medical Practitioners,
12 Vond. L. Rev. 549, 621-31 (1959); Note, 23 Mo. L. Rev. 203 (1958); Comment, 30 So. Calif. L. Rev.
80 (1956); Note, 9 Stanford L. Rev. 731 (1957).
161 Yborra v. Spongard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944) (unconscious patient received shoulder
injury during appendectomy).
162 137 Colo. at 549, 328 P.2d at 91.
163 Beadles v. Metayka, 135 Colo. 366, 371, 311 P.2d 711, 714 (1957).
164 E.g., Brown v. Hughes, 94 Colo. 295, 305, 30 P.2d 259, 263 (1934) "The burden was on plaintiff
to show that the acts of the defendants complained of were the direct cause of death . . . . There
is no evidence in this case, which would support a verdict, that death would not have otherwise ensued. The burden is not met by a showing that it might have resulted from the operations
complained of, and jurors should not be left to coniecture as to the efficient and proximate cause.
The possibility of death as a result of such operations is not sufficient. There should be evidence
eliminating the intervention of other causes which might exist."
165 Farrah v. Patton, 99 Colo. 41, 59 P.2d 76 (1936).
166 Hanley v. Spencer, 108 Colo. 184, 115 P.2d 399 (1941).
167 Lamme v. Ortega, 129 Cola. 149, 267 P.2d 1115 (1954). And see note 164 supra.
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cause independent of his own act.'6 t But there is some Colorado
authority indicating that the plaintiff's affirmative showing that
the defendant probably caused the injury must be accompanied by
evidence "eliminating the intervention of other causes which might
exist." 65
After the burden of proving negligence, causation and damages
has been met, the plaintiff will have to meet and overcome whatever defenses the defendant has raised.
V.

DEFENSES

The usual defenses to negligence liability are available in medical malpractice cases on the same terms as in other cases. For example, the plaintiff may be guilty of contributory negligence in
failing to follow his physician's advice to remain in the hospital for
further treatment or diagnosis' 7" or failing to seek other medical
care after 1becoming
dissatisfied with the defendant physician's min71
istrations.
For the most part the law governing defenses presents few
problems peculiar to malpractice law. One possible exception is
the defense of mistake of judgment, which has already been discussed.17 2 Two others are the defenses of release and statute of
limitations.
A. Release
The nature and theory of the plaintiff's claim may be important
in determining whether the defense of release is available to the
defendant. This defense is the plea that the plaintiff has released
another and the release operates to bar the malpractice claim. 17 3
For example, in Sams v. Curfman174 the plaintiff was injured when
his car collided with a creamery company truck. The injuries he
thus received were treated by the defendant physicians. First the
plaintiff sued the creamery company and its driver, receiving a
sizable cash settlement in return for signing a release in the usual
broad terms. The physicians were not parties to the action thus
compromised and they were not. mentioned in the release.
Soon after settling the first lawsuit, the plaintiff filed a second,
entirely separate, action against the physicians. This suit asked
compensatory and exemplary damages for "gross negligence and
wrongdoing" in diagnosis and treatment of the same injuries involved in the first action.
The doctor-defendants pleaded in bar the settlement and release with the creamery company, and the trial judge granted the
defendants judgment on the pleadings. In the Supreme Court, the
168 Hedgpeth v. Schoen, 109 Colo. 341, 342-43, 125 P.2d 632 (1942) "Where an efficient, adequate
cause for injuries has been found, it must be considered as the true cause, unless another,' not
incident to it, but independent of it, is shown to have intervened."
169 See, e.g., Lamme v. Ortega, 129 Colo. 149, 155, 267 P.2d 1115, 1118 (1954); Brown v.
Hughes, 94 Colo. 295, 306, 33 P.2d 259, 263 (1934).
170 This defense was raised .ut not passed on in Pearson v. Norman, 106 Colo. 396, 106 P.2d
361 (1940). See McGraw v. Kerr, 23 Cola. App. 163, 168, 128 Pac. 870, 873 (1912) (dictum), "A
patient is bound to submit to such treatment as his surgeon prescribes . . . . If he will not, his'
neglect is his own wrong or mistake for which he has no right to hold his surgeon responsible."
171 Hanley v. Spencer, 108 Colo. 184, 187, 115 P.2d 399, 400 (1941) (court indicated such conduct
is contributory negligence as marier of law).
172 See text at notes 63-69 supra.
173 Cases on this problem from other jurisdictions are collected in Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1075 (1955).
174 111 Colo. 124, 137 P.2d 1017 (1943).
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plaintiff argued that his complaint for malpractice alleged both a
tort and a breach of contract. He contended that the contract action against the physicians should not be barred by his settlement
of a tort action against the creamery company. Moreover, he asserted, there was no causal connection between the wrong of the
creamery company driver and the later malpractice.
Defendants countered that the action against the doctors was
in form and nature a tort action, that it asked damages which
would have been recoverable in the initial action as proximately
caused by the creamery's original wrong, and that the one cause of
action for those damages had been settled and co-liable tortfeasors
released.
The high court, after a brief struggle with the issue whether
the complaint sounded in tort or contract, held that the complaint
set out a tort cause of action, and therefore it was barred by the release. By implication, at least, the opinion indicates that an action
against the physicians for breach of contract would not have been
barred by settling the claim against the prior tortfeasor.
The Sams case points out a pitfall for plaintiffs' attorneys. They
should not be tempted, in cases involving medical malpractice in
treating injuries caused by a prior tortfeasor, to settle with the
wrongdoer whose tort brought the claimant to the doctor's office,
even where the original tort caused minor damage in comparison
with the malpractice, or where the original tortfeasor's liability is
highly doubtful. Even assuming such a settlement would not bar
a later contract claim against the physician, damages for breach
of contract might be severely limited, and175of course no exemplary
damages are available in a contract action.
It might be noted that, strictly speaking, the Sams rationale
may not apply today. The court carefully specified that the complaint was governed by rules of pleading which did not allow
commingling of tort and contract theories in a single cause of action.
It is possible that under the present more liberal pleading 176 the
court would hold in similar circumstances that if the facts alleged
stated a claim on a contract theory, settlement of a tort claim
against a prior wrongdoer would not bar the contract action
against the doctors. Moreover, the whole idea that a release of one
joint, concurrent or consecutive tortfeasor releases all others has
justification in neither logic nor legal history and has been severely
criticized. 7 7 This is another area where the Supreme Court of Colorado, which of late has so dramatically demonstrated its determination not to adhere blindly to unsound or unjust precedents, 178 may
greatly improve the law if given the opportunity.
The Colorado court has already recognized certain limitations
on the harsh rule that the release of a prior tortfeasor releases a
physician who negligently treats injuries caused by that tortfeasor.
Thus where the initial injury is covered by workmen's compensation, the injured workman may, in some cases, accept his compen175 Sams v. Curfman, 111 Colo. 124, 127-28, 137 P.2d 1017, 1018 (1943) (dictum).
,76 Colo. R. Civ. P., Rule 8 (3) allows setting out in a complaint, "two or more statements of a
claim or defense alternately or hypothetically, either in one count . . . or in separate counts ....
"
The same rule provides that a plaintiff may state as many claims as he has regardless of consistency.
177 See, e.g., Prosser, Torts 244 (1955).
178 See, e.g., Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 338 P.2d 702 (1959); Canon City v. Menris
137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958).
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sation award and release his employer without necessarily sacrificing his action for medical malpractice. Whether this is possible
in a particular case turns on the theory of the action and the relation
of the party sued to the plaintiff.
For example, in Hennig v. Crested Butte Co. 179 the injured
workman, after accepting a compensation award and releasing his
employer, brought action against the employer for injuries allegedly
sustained through malpractice of a physician who had been employed by the defendant-employer to treat the workman. Apparently
the plaintiff sought to hold the defendant, the employer of both
the physician and the plaintiff, vicariously liable for the physician's
alleged malpractice. This, said the Supreme Court, could not be
done in the face of a release of the same defendant after payment
of a compensation claim filed for the same injury and all disability
arising from or connected with it.
It should be noted that the Hennig case said nothing about the
right of an already compensated workman to sue the doctor whose
negligent treatment may have greatly aggravated the injury incurred on the job. Hennig was an action against the employer. There
are many reasons for allowing a separate medical malpractice action after settlement of the original workmen's compensation claim.
First, the compensation act was intended as humanitarian, beneficial protection for injured workmen, not as a refuge for negligent
doctors. The latter are strangers to the act,so and, unlike covered
employers, have not exchanged the disadvantage of liability without fault for the advantage of liability limited in amount. The
act's purpose of benefitting workmen should not be perverted into
denying them a common law action probably included in the Bill
of Rights guarantee of a remedy for every wrong.'
Second, the amount of a workmen's compensation award has
little or no relation to the actual pecuniary loss of the claimant.
Such an arbitrary and often pitifully inadequate award should not
be substituted for an opportunity to obtain satisfaction in the form
of damages commensurate with the injury. There has already been
too much judicial confusion of "satisfaction" of claims with "release"
or tortfeasors. ' 2 Legislative deprivation of this claim for compen17992 Colo. 459, 21 P.2d 1115 (1933)
180 See the discussion of this point in Froid v. Knowles, 95 Colo. 223, 228, 36 P.2d 156, 158 (1934).
is1 Colo. Const. art. II, § 6. The Colorado court indicated concern on this issue in Froid v. Knowles,
95 Colo. 223, 234, 36 P.2d 156, 161 (1934).
18 See Prosser, Torts 243-46 (1955).
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satory damages
might well constitute a taking of property without
8 3
due process.1
Third, the claim against the employer is essentially separate
and different from the malpractice claim. The job-incurred injury
is generally separated in time, place and causation from the malpractice injury. The employer and the doctor usually are not joint
nor even concurrent tortfeasors. The employer's liability is not
based on fault but is relational, arising out of the contract relation
of employer and employee. The physician's liability, on the
other hand, is nearly always in tort.' 84 Often the damages may be
divisible or at least capable of apportionment. For example, an employee may incur a hernia from on-the-job strain. If, in preparing
him for a hernia operation, the surgeon negligently allowed him
to fall off the operating table and fracture an arm,""5 there would
be no problem whatever in allocating damages to the separate injuries. Yet even in this kind of case it is not clear that the workman would have a separate claim against the surgeon if the surgeon
had been employed by the workman's employer.
Fortunately it appears settled in Colorado that the injured employee has a separate claim for malpractice against a physician
whom the employee himself selects and pays to treat an, injury
covered by workmen's compensation.'8 6 Therefore a settlement of
the workmen's compensation claim in such a case does not bar a
later action against the workman's personal physician for malpractice. 8 7 It is submitted that the rule should be the same when
the physician is selected and paid by the employer or his compensation insurance carrier. Mere formalities, such as who retained
and paid the physician, do not affect the inherent separateness of
the claims, and they should not determine whether settlement of
one bars the other.
B. Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations as a defense presents special problems in malpractice cases. At least two of these problems have
been dealt with by the Colorado Supreme Court and are worthy of
discussion here. They are the problems encountered by courts when
asked to decide: (a) when the statute of limitations begins running or is tolled, and (b) which of several possibly applicable statutes of limitations properly applies in a particular case.
A third problem, the question whether the special two year
Colorado malpractice statute is constitutional, has never been
raised for decision by the Supreme Court. However, the question
has more than academic interest and will be discussed briefly here.
When statute begins running-tolling. The weight of authority
holds that a statute of limitations governing malpractice begins to
183 See Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 370, 149 P.2d '372, 375 (1944) (medical malpractice).
"A legal right to damage for an injury is property and one can not be deprived of his property
without due process."
184 "It will aid our study, we think, if we shall keep in mind that the liability of a tort-feasor
is predicated on fault, that of an employer under the compensation act, on relationship." Froid v.
Knowles, 95 Cola. 223, 226, 36 P.2d 156, 158 (1934).
185 Compare the facts in Beadles v. Metayka, 135 Colo. 366, 311 P.2d 711 (1957), 34 DICTA 351.
186 Froid v. Knowles, 95 Colo. 223, 36 P.2d 156 (1934).
187 Ibid.
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run when the act or omission alleged as malpractice occurs. 8 The
majority seem to enforce this view even where the malpractice is
not discovered until after the statute has barred any action. 189 Other
courts, however, have held that the statute does not commence
running until the malpractice results in injury. 190 The latter view
seems more consistent with the broader rule that statutes of limitations do not start running until a claim accrues, at least when it is
considered that actual loss or damage is an indispensable element of
a negligence claim. 191 Still another minority view holds that the
statute does not run prior to the time the plaintiff discovers 92
or by
reasonable diligence should have discovered the malpractice.
The Colorado Supreme Court has never directly declared which
of the above views it prefers, and on at least one occasion has ex93
pressly declined to decide when the statute commences to run'
while seeming to hold, in effect, that the statute does not run until
discovery of the injury.
Two Colorado cases9 4 have involved the problem of tolling the
statute of limitations. The first, and most dramatic, was Rosane v.
Senger.195 There the defendants had left a gauze pad in the plaintiff's abdomen during surgery performed on her in 1930. After more
than ten years of suffering without realizing the cause, the plaintiff learned through exploratory surgery performed by another
doctor that the gauze pad left behind in the prior surgery had been
causing her discomfort. Thus it appeared from the plaintiff's own
evidence not only that injury, i.e. damage, had occurred, but also
that she had discovered the fact of injury (although not the precise
cause) more than two years before she brought suit. She instituted
action in 1941, over eleven years after the act alleged as malpractice, but only about one year after she first learned of that act.
The Supreme Court opinion does not state whether the defendant
surgeons knew they had left the pad inside the plaintiff, nor is
there a recital of any specific attempt by them to conceal their
mistake.
As seen by the court the issue was: "Does justifiable delay, due
to plaintiff's ignorance of the cause of a known injury, stop the
running of the statute when plaintiff has used every reasonable
effort to ascertain that cause and been frustrated solely by defendants' concealment? In other words
under such circumstances,
1 96
when did the cause of action accrue?'
The Supreme Court, acknowledging but repudiating the contrary majority view, held that the statute commenced running
only upon the plaintiff's discovery that the pad had been left inside
188 Regan, Doctor and Patient and the Law 244-45 (1956); 41 Am. Jur. Physicians and Surgeons
123 (1942); 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 60 (1951). Cases collected in Annots., 7.4 A.I.R. 1317
(1931), 144 A.L.R. 209 (1943).
189 See, e.g., Becker v. Porter, 119 Kan. 626, 240 Pac. 584 (1925).. And see authorities cited in
note 188 supra.
190 E.g., Carter v. Harlan Hospital Ass'n, 265 Ky. 452, 97 S.W.2d 9 (1936); Meredith, Malpractice
Liability of Doctors and Hospitals 206-07 (1956).
191 Prosser, Torts 165 (1955).
192 This is the rule in California. Ehlen v. Burrows, 51 Cal. App. 2d 141, 124 P.2d 82 (1942).
193 See Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 367, 149 P.2d 372, 374 (1944).
194 Ibid. And see Davis v. Bonebrake, 135 Colo. 506, 313 P.2d 982 (1957).
195 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944).
196 Id. at 367, 149 P.2d at 374. (Emphasis added.) Note that'the question when.the cause of action
accrues is technically different from the question whether certain facts toll the statute, but the
court lumped the two as one issue.
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her. In reference to the prevailing rule that the statute is tolled
only by fraudulent concealment,'197 the opinion declared: "We are
not impressed with the reasoning which supports the materiality
of fraud."'198 The court reasoned that whether the concealment was
fraudulent or not made no practical difference to the plaintiff, for
without knowledge of facts upon which to base a complaint, "the
victim (would be) equally helpless regardless of the motive for
concealment.' '199 Further the court expressed concern that strict enforcement of the
majority position might raise serious constitu200
tional questions.
Clearly the Rosane case establishes that to toll the statute no
fraud in the sense of scienter or actual intent to deceive need be
shown. But throughout the opinion the court indicates that concealment is the effective ingredient. Yet nowhere is there mention
of what constituted concealment in this case. It is not even stated
that the defendants knew they had left the pad inside the plaintiff.
This poses the question whether the court really held that mere
ignorance of facts constituting the claim tolls the statute. If this
be the proper interpretation, the case created a new and not
generally recognized exception to the general rule that the plaintiff's mere ignorance of facts giving him an action does not delay the
running of the statute of limitations.2 0 ' The latter rule has been
recognized in Colorado, 20 2 but in a case rejected in Rosane as
not
2 04
in point20 3 and later modified if not overruled by legislation.
Colorado's apparent adherence to the liberal minority view that
ignorance of the facts constituting a cause of action tolls the statute
was affirmed if not extended in the 1957 case of Davis v. Bonebrake.205 There the plaintiff alleged that during a hysterectomy
done August 17, 1951, the defendant surgeons left a sponge in her
abdomen. A second operation was performed September 5, 1951,
and the plaintiff learned in October, 1953, that the latter operation
had been done for the purpose of removing the sponge left behind
in the first operation. The complaint was filed October 16, 1953,
more than two years afterV.both operations, but shortly after the
plaintiff obtained specific knowledge of the alleged malpractice.
The plaintiff contended that the defendants had been guilty of
fraudulent concealment which tolled the statute. The defendants
cited testimony of the plaintiff as showing that she knew, or with
reasonable care should have known, shortly after the first operation that something had been left inside her. Specifically, the plaintiff had testified in a deposition that shortly after the first operation she noticed on her abdomen a lump about the size of a partially opened fist. The following cross-examination occurred:
"Q. Now, you thought that it was a foreign object of
some kind, didn't you, Mrs. Bonebrake? A. Well, I didn't
think you could grow something just that fast ....
197 Cases cited in Annots., 74 A.L.R. 1317 (1931), 144 A.L.R. 209 (1943).
198 Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 369, 149 P.2d 372, 375 (1944).
199 Ibid. (Parenthetical matter added).
200 Id. at 370. 149 P.2d at 375.
201 See Note, 17 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 124 (1944).
202 Miller v. Industrial Comm'n, 106 Colo. 364, 105 P.2d 404 (1940).
203 Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 369, 149 P.2d 372, 375 (1944).
204 See Industrial Comm'n v. Newton Co., 135 Colo. 594, 600, 314 P.2d 297, 301 (1957).
205 135 Colo. 506, 313 P.2d 982 (1957).

DICTA

JULY-AuGuST

1959

Q. But you believe (sic) that it was not something
that was part of you, is that correct?
A. Well, I felt-I mean
2 0' 6
-there was something there.
Plaintiff further testified that she knew something was wrong
but had no idea precisely what the matter was. In addition she
claimed that she had questioned the doctors and the surgical nurse
seeking information but had been rebuffed. Eventually she had
learned from the surgical nurse that the second operation had been
performed to correct the error of the first.
On appeal of a trial court judgment for the plaintiff, the
Supreme Court held that the evidence presented a jury issue
whether the plaintiff knew about the malpractice more than two
years before she filed action. An additional ground for affirming
the trial court on this point, said the high court, was that, at best,
the plaintiff's testimony as to what occurred during the allegedly
negligent operation "cannot arise above that of the conjecture of a
non-observer of the event.12 0 7 The court indicated that such testimony is incompetent to establish "discovery" by the plaintiff which
would start the statute of limitations running.
Bonebrake indicates the lengths to which the Supreme Court
will go to avoid enforcing the two-year statute of limitations. Mr.
Justice Day, in a dissenting opinion, asserted that the majority
opinion in effect had repealed the statute. 2 0° This general attitude
of the court toward the special malpractice statute of limitations is
extremely significant in a context yet to be discussed,
the question
20 9
whether the special statute is unconstitutional.
Which statute of limitations applies. The leading Colorado case
governing applicability of limitations is the Smith case.2 10 There the
complaint alleged that the plaintiff had employed the defendant
surgeon to perform a circumcision operation, but the defendant,
"without Plaintiff's authorization did then and there commit an
unlawful battery . . . by performing upon Plaintiff's person a surgical operation known as a Vasectomy which rendered the Plaintiff
sterile .... ,,2l1
No circumcision was performed. It was not claimed
that the vasectomy was performed in any but the most careful and
expert manner; the sole complaint was that the claimant did not
get the operation he asked for.
Alert defense counsel moved to dismiss on the ground that the
action, by the plaintiff's own characterization, constituted a suit for
"an unlawful battery" and since it had not been commenced within
one year after the defendant's act, it was barred by the one year
statute of limitations governing battery cases.2 12 The trial court
denied the motion, holding the special two year malpractice statute
of limitations 213 applicable. After taking evidence, the trial judge
206 Id. at 510-11, 313 P.2d at 985.
207 Id. at 513, 313 P.2d at 986.
208 Id. at 524, 313 P.2d at 992.
209 See text at note 225 infra.
210 Maercklein v. Smith, 129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954).
-11 129 Colo. at 74, 266 P.2d at 1096.
212 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 87-1-2 (1953), provides: "All actions for assault and battery . . . shall
be commenced within one year after the cause of action shall accrue, and not afterwards."
213 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 87-1-6 (1953): "No person shall be permitted to maintain an action, whether
such action sound in tort or implied contract, to recover damages from any person licensed to practice
medicine, chiropractic, osteopathy, chiropody, midwifery or dentistry on account of the alleged
negligence of such person in the practice of the profession for which he is licensed or on account of
his failure to posse!-s or exercise that degree of skill which he actually or imnoliedly represented
promised or agreed that he did possess and would exercise, unless such action be instituted within
two years after such cause of action accrued."
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directed a verdict for the plaintiff on the issue of liability, leaving
only the question of damages to the jury.
On writ of error, the Supreme Court of Colorado upheld the
trial court decision that the special two year medical malpractice
statute of limitations applied. The high court, however, acknowledged that negligence in treatment and treatment without employment present claims basically different in nature. "The one is based
on the existence of a contract and authority for service, and the
other upon the lack of such contract or authority. The one is based
on lack of care or skill in the performance of services contracted
for, and the other on wrongful trespass on the person regardless
of the skill or care employed. ' 21 4 Distinguishing a prior case2 15 where
the complaint had alleged battery in continuing treatment after
the patient's consent had been revoked by discharging the physician, the Supreme Court ruled that the special two year statute
governing malpractice applies wherever the doctor's act occurs
while there is in force a contract of employment from which a
professional relation to the patient arises. The court reasoned that
the gist of the action was an alleged negligent act, not in lack of
surgical skill but in failure to observe "that degree of care which,
as practitioners,
they owed to their patient in the practice of their
21
profession.
The opinion indicated that wherever the basic relationship of
physician and patient is established, malpractice is not classifiable,
for purposes of statutes of limitations, as either battery or negligence, but is a kind of hybrid. Said the court, "While an unauthorized operation is, in contemplation of law, an assault and battery,
it also amounts to malpractice, even though negligence is not
charged."217
Thus it appears settled in Colorado that the special two-year
medical malpractice statute of limitations applies to either negligent
or intentional acts of a doctor who has been employed to perform
some treatment or operation. But this by no means solves all the
problems.
Although the special two-year malpractice statute of limitations
applies even to claims founded on treatments or operations beyond
the patient's consent, it probably does not apply to actions arising
from treatment or surgery without consent. A dictum in the 1954
Smith case declared that if the patient consents "to no operation at
all, then clearly it is a case of assault and battery, which would be
barred by the (one-year) statute of limitations."2 18
The Smith opinion carefully distinguished the facts there presented from the facts alleged in the earlier case of Cady v. Fraser.21220
In Cady the plaintiff claimed "malpractice similar to an assault"
consisting of the physician's continuing treatment after the plain214 129 Colo. at 75, 266 P.2d at 1096, quoting Cady v. Fraser, 122 Colo. 252, 255, 222 P.2d 422,
424 (1950).
215 Cady v. Fraser, supra note 214.
216 129 Colo. at 78, 266 P.2d at 1098.
217 Id. at 77, 266 P.2d at 1098.
218 Id. at 80, 266 P.2d at 1099 (dictum).
219 122 Colo. 252, 222 P.2d 422 (1950).
220 Id. at 254, 222 P.2d at 423.
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tiff had told him to "get off the case .... -"221 Although the precedent value of Cady is weakened by the fact that there the plaintiff's claim died for lack of proof, the significance of the case lies
in the fact that in Smith the Supreme Court took pains to distinguish the facts alleged in Cady.22 2 Thus the Smith opinion clearly
implied that facts such as those pleaded in Cady would present
a claim in the nature of assault and battery, subject to a one-year
statute of limitations. This rationale affirms the fundamental proposition that the physician-patient relation is consensua 223 and indicates that the relationship may be terminated by the patient's
withdrawing a consent previously given. Treatment after withdrawal of consent would amount to trespass. A fortiori it would
seem that a physician who renders treatment without ever obtaining consent in the first instance commits battery and, if the patient
is conscious, both assault and battery. 224 An action seeking damages for such conduct would have to be brought within one year.
Under the Smith rationale it would seem proper to infer that a
malpractice claim based on a breach of contract theory would be
governed by the two-year malpractice limitation rather than the
statute of limitations governing other contract actions.
Constitutionality of the special statute of limitations on malpractice. The Smith precedent, obviating many problems inevitably
present where the inherent unlikeness of various kinds of malpractice claims is recognized, rests on the bald assumption that the
special two year statute of limitations is constitutional. If that statute is not constitutional, a question never decided by the Colorado
Supreme Court, then, presumably, a malpractice claim would be
barred in one year or six years depending on whether it was in the
nature of battery, negligence, or breach of contract. Thus a consideration of the constitutionality of the special two year medical malpractice statute becomes imperative.
The Colorado Constitution guarantees that, "Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for
every injury to person . . . and right and justice should be administered without sale, denial or delay. ' '225 In a 1934 case 226 the Supreme
Court indicated that this provision might be offended by legislation abrogating the common law rule that, "a physician or surgeon
227
is beholden for injury to his patient resulting from malpractice.
The court there implied that an attempt by the legislature to
substitute a workmen's compensation claim for an employee's malpractice action against his physician would be unconstitutional.
In a 1944 case involving the special medical malpractice statute,
the court served notice that, "A legal right to damage for injury
is property and one cannot be deprived of his property without
due process. ' 2 28 More recent opinions indicate that the present
Supreme Court, to the credit of its incumbents, will not meekly
221 Ibid.
222 129 Colo. at 75, 266 P.2d at 1096-97.
223 41 Am. Jur. Physicians and Surgeons §§ 71, 108 (1942).
224 Cases collected in Annots., 76 A.L.R. 562 (1932), 139 A.L.R. 1370 (1943).
225 Colo. Const. art. II, § 6.
226 Froid v. Knowles, 95 Colo. 223, 36 P.2d 156 (1934).
227 Id. at 234, 36 P.2d at 161.
228 Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 370, 149 P.2d 372, 375 (1944).
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tolerate
legislative denials of or infringements upon constitutional
229
rights.
But the Colorado Constitution poses a more potent threat to
the special malpractice statute of limitations. The constitution expressly forbids the general assembly to pass "special laws . . . for
limitation of civil actions .... "230 Prior to 1925, there was no special
statute of limitations on malpractice in Colorado. Presumably members of the healing professions were then shielded only by the
same limitations statutes applied to others, including other professional men liable to malpractice claims. But by the 1920's the
American Medical Association was making its influence felt in
legislatures across the land. In 1925 the Colorado legislature passed
the present special statute.231 With magnanimous generosity, or perhaps with one eye on the constitutional prohibition of class legislation and the other on the electorate, the statute's protection was extended to not only the more orthodox practitioners of medicine and
surgery, but, in addition, to anyone licensed to practice, "chiropractic, osteopathy, chiropody, midwifery or dentistry ....
"232
This
broad coverage may somewhat bolster the statute against a contention that it is class legislation.
Notably, however, the statute does not protect a nurse or
hospital from an action for the same kind of negligence, possibly
the same act of negligence, for which an action against the named
practitioners would be barred. This points up the essential weakness of the statute. It is not in essence a legislative declaration that
a certain type of action-malpractice-is a disfavored action and
will be barred unless promptly instituted. It is not like the statute
barring actions for assault and battery, false imprisonment, or
slander and libel after one year. Those actions are barred whether
the defendant be a doctor, lawyer or Indian chief. There the basis
for legislative classification is the nature of the action, not the profession of the defendant. But the malpractice statute is solely for
the benefit of a favored class of medical practitioners, and bars all
actions whether based on "tort or implied contract.12 23 What non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory reason exists for classifying all "tort
or implied contract" malpractice actions against a doctor differently from the same kinds of actions against a nurse or a lawyer?
The arbitrariness of the classification would be immediately apparent to physicians if the legislature should provide that all negligence actions be barred in two years, except that negligence actions
against a practitioner of "medicine, chiropractic, osteopathy, chiro-

pody, midwifery or dentistry.

...

"1234

should not be barred in less

than ten years. That the Colorado Supreme Court is not thoroughly
in sympathy with the special statute is indicated by recent decisions
229 See e.g., Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 174, 323 P.2d 614, 617 (1958). "Expedience
not override the Constitution of Colorado; it should not dethrone rights guaranteed thereunder."
230 Colo. Const. art. V, § 25.
221 Colo. Rev. Stat. J 87-1-6 (1953).
222 Ibid.
233 Ibid.
234 Ibid.
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severely limiting its scope.235 Given an opportunity, the court might
seriously consider invalidating the statute altogether.
VI. CONCLUSION
As should be obvious from the above discussion, the medical
malpractice area is one of great technical and practical difficulty
for the lawyer. For the doctor the increasing frequency of malpractice claims presents a growing threat to professional reputation
as well as financial solvency. Physicians should not be distracted
from concentrating their best efforts on behalf of a patient by the
ever-present storm cloud of potential legal liability. This is an area
calling for greater cooperation of the medical and legal professions
in the public interest. The public interest would be served by more
stringent enforcement of the lawyer's duty not to accept claims
not well founded in fact, law and basic justice. A professional man's
most valuable asset is his reputation for competence in his chosen
field. An attorney as a professional man should refuse to have any
part in damaging the reputation of another professional man unless
convinced that the claimant has really been injured and that his
claim has genuine and provable merit.
The Colorado Medical Society and the Colorado Bar Association are presently working to establish a joint medical-legal board
to hear and screen malpractice cases. If a claim is found to have
merit, the medical society will aid the claimant in obtaining needed
expert evidence. If a claim is found to be without merit, the claimant will be left to his usual legal remedies. It is the hope of both
cooperating groups that this screening process will be effective in
helping claimants' attorneys determine for themselves whether
claims they are pressing should be litigated. If the plan functions
properly, it should eliminate many groundless claims not only short
of actual trial, but prior to release of publicity which may cause
irreparable damage to an entirely innocent doctor. This is an effort
at interprofessional cooperation which should have the sincere support of every man of good will in either profession.
235 E.G., Davis v. Bonebrake, 135 Colo. 506, 313 P.2d 982 (1957) (Mr. Justice Day, dissenting,
argued that the majority opinion had in effect repealed the statute of limitations); Rosane v. Senger,
112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944) (ignorance of plaintiff or impossibility of bringing suit tolls the
statute even though no fraudulent concealment by defendant is shown).
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